Recently, AMD, a long-established x86 giant, was found to have a hardware-level vulnerability, StackWarp, prompting security risk warnings for multiple Zen architecture processors. Earlier, the China Cyberspace Security Association, in an article titled "Frequent Vulnerabilities and High Failure Rates Require System Investigation of Intel Product Network Security Risks," listed several security vulnerabilities exposed in Intel CPUs in recent years.

This demonstrates that various vulnerabilities frequently plague the x86 camp. Fortunately, Hygon CPUs, holding full x86 licenses, have been confirmed by the industry to be immune to this vulnerability. Amidst these unexpected security tests, the domestic and international x86 camps are becoming increasingly clearly distinct.

From SEV-SNP to CSV

Can new vulnerabilities only open old doors?

The StackWarp vulnerability originates from a new discovery by the CISPA Helmholtz Centre for Information Security in Germany. According to researchers, in the context of AMD SEV-SNP, this vulnerability allows a malicious VM host to manipulate the stack pointer of a guest virtual machine. This enables attackers to hijack control and data flow, thereby achieving remote code execution and privilege escalation within a confidential virtual machine.

From the perspective of the vulnerability's attack logic, SEV-SNP is a critical intrusion portal. The AMD SEV-SNP virtual machine uses an untrusted host security model. The StackWarp vulnerability allows the host to modify bit 19 of MSR 0xC001102E, causing an abnormal update of the virtual machine's RSP register value.

Since the virtual machine program stack stores function return addresses and program execution data, attackers can tamper with the virtual machine's RSP register to manipulate the virtual machine's program execution control and data flow. Furthermore, by exploiting the SEV-SNP virtual machine's single-step execution mechanism, attackers can exit to the host at specific instructions within the virtual machine to launch a precise attack.

Following this news, AMD issued an official statement saying, "Through internal testing, collaboration with the external research community, and bug bounty programs, AMD continues to take measures to protect end users and customers. The low-risk vulnerability mentioned in SB-3027 is a result of these efforts, and the relevant patch has been available for AMD EPYC products since July of last year."

However, according to industry insiders, Hygon CPUs exhibit a natural immunity to these vulnerability threats. Experts point out that because Hygon has independently developed CSV virtualization technology in the field of confidential computing, such as the CSV3 used, which is fundamentally different from SEV-SNP, the StackWarp vulnerability attack path is completely ineffective.

This is easy to understand. StackWarp can be used to carry out attacks only if the host has the ability to modify the virtual machine page table to construct a virtual machine for single-step execution. Compared to AMD SEV-SNP, Hygon CPUs' independently developed CSV3 has already fundamentally changed the underlying technical logic. Attackers do not have the conditions for virtual machine single-step execution, and naturally cannot open this new door of Hygon CPUs.

Through obscure technical language, this security battle truly tests the independent innovation capabilities of domestically produced CPUs.

From x86 to C86

Independent innovation delivers security value

Whether it's "genuine learning" or simply "copying from the textbook" is particularly crucial for domestically produced chips that initially relied heavily on imports. Faced with ubiquitous security risks, failing to truly digest, absorb, and innovate can easily lead to the predicament of "copying the wrong answer."

The localization process of Hygon CPUs in the x86 market provides a reverse validation of this logic. Public information shows that Hygon has independently completed multiple rounds of product iteration and formed a sustainable, evolving domestic C86 technology roadmap. However, compared to the continuous improvement in C86 chip performance, its independently built security technology defenses are often less noticeable.

Previously, media outlets tracked and reported on domestic and international x86 chips. They found that from the very beginning of C86 localization research and development, Hygon independently expanded security algorithm instructions and integrated a security processor into the CPU, achieving native support for cryptographic technology, trusted computing, and privacy computing.

Furthermore, regarding the more critical vulnerability defense, due to the hardware-level native security technology evolution of C86 compared to x86, Hygon CPUs can achieve immunity or repair against many vulnerabilities present in other x86 chips (such as Meltdown and Spectre). These two points corroborate each other, demonstrating that the domestically developed C86 chip has successfully distinguished itself within the global x86 camp, objectively realizing the value of self-developed technology.

Undoubtedly, the construction of a chip security system ultimately relies on independent innovation. Faced with vulnerabilities frequently encountered by x86 chips, domestically produced chips are undergoing a comprehensive test of their autonomy and security.

Source: Semiconductor Industry Observer